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In a context characterized by public spending reviews and research funding short-
ages, governments in several countries are putting pressure on universities to in-
crease their applied research activity, intensify their interaction with industry, and
attract funding from the nonacademic domain. The economic literature provides
rich evidence on the convergence between institutional factors and individual-level
characteristics that are influencing university involvement in knowledge transfer
activities. The aim of this article is to investigate the impact of universities’
regulation of knowledge transfer activities on the institutional capability to raise
funding from research contracts and consultancies. Based on extensive depart-
ment-level data on university funding, we address the characteristics of institu-
tional knowledge transfer practices and investigate how these activities influence
the intensity of funding to Italian universities.
JEL classification: L24, L31, O32, O33.
1. Introduction
One of the key institutional challenges governments face in their efforts to support
innovation activity is easing the transfer of technology, and knowledge more broadly,
from academic institutions to businesses and other non-academic public or private
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entities (OECD, 2003). Although universities are involved in so-called
“third-mission” activities (Geuna and Muscio, 2009), a deeper connection between
university and nonacademic institutions (mainly, but not exclusively, firms) is con-
sidered essential for technological progress and economic development. Demands are
increasing for universities to produce research that is valuable to agents outside the
“ivory tower” of academia and to intensify the interactions with them. The expect-
ation is that universities should not only produce new knowledge, but that this
knowledge should be related to established social and economic targets (Laredo,
2007).
Universities may derive several benefits from engagement in knowledge transfer
activities. Many of these benefits are associated with patenting and licensing activity
(Baldini et al., 2007) and include increased financial earnings that can be devoted to
research activity (AUTM, 2003; OECD, 2003); reinforced academic reputation,
which helps to attract the smartest students and brightest faculty (Florida, 1999);
establishment of communication channels with companies, which may bring several
benefits such as new ideas for research and a better understanding of applications of
basic theory, PhD training, internships, and employment for students.
At the institutional level, universities need to find ways to regulate and manage
this relatively new set of activities related to knowledge transfer, which was not
“somehow” discovered as scholars in the Triple Helix and Mode Two Knowledge
traditions (Gibbons et al., 1994; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) would argue.
These authors propose the idea of a new academic revolution characterized by uni-
versities’ involvement in knowledge transmission (Geuna and Muscio, 2009).
There is substantial agreement in the economic literature that governments need
to put in place measures necessary to encourage and facilitate knowledge transfer
from university to industry and other institutions. There is a considerable body of
scientific literature that focuses on the “commercialization” of academic research
results, which essentially involves the creation of intellectual property (IP), and
academic entrepreneurship, and which investigates its drivers and the related busi-
ness funding opportunities for universities. Some recent studies stress the relevance
of academic consultancies, research-to-order, and collaborative research—activities
described as “academic engagement” (Perkmann et al., 2013)—as effective and fre-
quent informal channels of knowledge transfer. Their highly relational nature ampli-
fies potential spillovers (Jensen et al., 2010) and activates learning by interaction
processes (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008).
Public budget constraints are pushing many European country governments to
increase the pressure on universities to explore more external research funding op-
tions and modernize their managerial and organizational skills (European
Commission, 2008). Geuna (1999) notes that, since the early 1980s, European gov-
ernments have been intervening more directly to guide national research systems.
This intervention takes different forms in different countries, but is driven by similar
goals to promote a contractual-oriented approach to university research funding
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aimed at indirect control of university behavior through the introduction of (quasi-
market) financial incentive schemes. These policies are meant to improve the
efficiency of research funding, increase university accountability, and induce lower
costs. This last is being forced by reductions in public budgets as a result of impos-
ition of the Maastricht criteria (see So¨rlin, 2007).
The Italian university system for many years has relied on a fully public and highly
centralized governance structure with low levels of university autonomy and a key
role played by the State (Capano, 2000). Initiatives to support knowledge transfer in
Italy have been lacking, but political pressure to transfer the results of academic
research has increased,1 though the emphasis has been almost exclusively on the
development of university plans to support the “commercialization” of scientific
research. By 2005, most Italian universities had established Technology Transfer
Offices (TTO) and had put in place internal regulation to manage revenue sharing
and intellectual property rights (IPR). However, the design of governance mechan-
isms related to the activities described as “academic engagement” has received less
attention.2 Universities have been encouraged to regulate their knowledge transfer
activities, and establish rules related to research contracts and extramural consultan-
cies and many Italian academic institutions have in place a “regolamento contoterzi,”
which regulates in different ways and to different extents the distribution of revenues
and costs, the extent of staff involvement, etc.
There are several institutional and university-level factors, which, together with
demand conditions and individual-level characteristics, may drive university involve-
ment in knowledge transfer activities (Baldini et al., 2007). For instance, institutional
factors, such as legislation, that favor knowledge transfer and distribution of IPR, can
influence the intensity of interactions with nonacademic institutions and the provi-
sion of government funding. Similarly, university-level factors, such as provision of
incentives to academics, a favorable/competitive environment for invention and
commercialization, and implementation of support for knowledge transfer, can
also contribute.
Nevertheless, we know little about the impact on the intensity of knowledge
transfer, of university policies, and governance systems. In principle, facilitating
collaboration with nonacademic entities and the commercialization of discoveries
should be in the interests of both academics and society since the ultimate aim of
applied scientific research is to improve the human condition (Litan et al., 2008).
1 For example, national laws D.L. 27/7/1999 no. 297 and D.M. 8/8/2000 no. 593 encourage and
regulate the creation of university TTOs. Art. 65 of the Codice dei Diritti di Proprieta` Industriale,
10/02/2005, grants IPRs to scientists for their scientific discoveries.
2 Though there are several links and overlaps between “commercialization” and “academic engage-
ment,” these activities are different; the former refers to inventions generated within universities and
exploited mainly to reap financial benefits, the latter is characterized by ex ante collaborative
research projects and pursued for varying objectives (Perkmann et al., 2013).
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Empirical evidence provided by Caldera and Debande (2010) shows that university
rules on conflicts of interest between academic teaching responsibilities and external
activities, have a positive and significant impact on university performance in R&D
contracts, licensing, and spin-off creation. Also, university royalty sharing policies
have a major effect on licensing income, and awarding a higher share of licensing
royalties to inventors stimulates licensing activity. In this context, this article inves-
tigates the impact of academic management practices and internal regulation of
knowledge transfer activities on the capability to raise funding from industry via
consultancies, contract research, and research-to-order, i.e. via “academic engage-
ment.” Based on extensive data on university funding and regulation in Italy, we
address the characteristics of institutional knowledge transfer practices, and investi-
gate how internal governance and regulation influence the intensity of these sources
of university funding.
2. University performance in knowledge transfer
2.1 The role of university policies and governance
Few studies underline the importance of university regulation and the adoption of an
institutional strategic approach to the valorization of research to foster knowledge
transfer (Siegel et al., 2007a). The effectiveness and performance of universities in
knowledge transfer generally depends on the complex interplay among different
elements at various levels (Muscio and Pozzali, 2013): system level, described in
the systems of innovation literature (Edquist, 2005); institutional level, which ex-
plains differences among universities operating within the same system (Di Gregorio
and Shane, 2003); and the individual level (Bercovitz and Feldman, 2008).
In this article we focus on the institutional level, in particular, on university
policies which involve strategic decisions and a governance design aimed at promot-
ing and regulating knowledge transfer activity and motivating faculty members to
engage in interactions with nonacademic organizations. The increased scale and
variety of university knowledge transfer activities are requiring improved strategies
and governance systems able to cope with the increased size and complexity of
universities, and their highly specialized and diverse group-based production
(Geuna and Muscio, 2009). As a consequence, traditional academic tasks are being
redefined and expanded (Etzkowitz et al., 2000).
This process of internal transformation is evident in several university initiatives.
To discuss their characteristics and the related empirical evidence, it is useful to recall
the distinction made in the preceding section about the multiple ways in which
university research results are transferred (Salter and Martin, 2001; D’Este and
Patel, 2007; Muscio, 2010). The wide variety of and diverse nature of transfer chan-
nels make it important to assess whether they are affected by the same drivers and
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can be addressed by the same policies and governance criteria. Following Perkmann
et al. (2013), knowledge transfer channels can be classified as commercialization or
academic engagement. Commercialization or “technology transfer” includes patent-
ing and licensing, as well as various forms of academic entrepreneurship (e.g.
spin-offs, incubators). Commercialization has received close attention from pol-
icymakers and researchers resulting in a large evidence base (O’Shea et al., 2005;
Siegel and Phan, 2006; Rothaermel et al., 2007). Academic engagement includes
knowledge-related collaboration (collaborative research, contract research, consult-
ing) between academic researchers and nonacademic entities (see D’Este and Patel,
2007; Muscio, 2010; Perkmann et al., 2011). This type of engagement is often con-
sidered a less formal type of knowledge transfer since the individuals involved tend to
carry out the related activities without relying on the intermediation and the support
of specialized university bodies. Most of these collaborations are governed by con-
tracts, sometimes framed by specific university regulation. The attention being paid
to academic engagement by researchers and policymakers is relatively recent, and the
empirical evidence is scarce and often mixed. According to the scientific literature,
university policies and governance options aimed at fostering commercialization and
academic engagement can be summarized under three broad heading: setting know-
ledge and technology transfer infrastructures; granting rewards to faculty members;
managing conflicts of interest.
2.1.1 Setting knowledge and technology transfer infrastructures
Since academic engagement is by nature more autonomously driven by individuals
and less organizationally embedded than commercialization (Perkmann et al., 2013),
policies related to the establishment of infrastructures aimed at facilitating univer-
sity–industry collaborations have been the subject mostly of technology transfer
studies. In order to encourage scientists to consider commercialization of their re-
search results and to support them through the process, many universities have
established knowledge and TTO (O’Gorman et al., 2008). The presence of technology
transfer intermediaries is generally found to be a relevant positive determinant of
research commercialization (Markman et al., 2005a,b; Phan and Siegel, 2006).
Formal technology transfer intermediation between academics and businesses
helps to reduce the “cognitive distance” between them (Muscio and Pozzali,
2013), and can provide valuable support for bringing university IP to the market.
However, there is mixed evidence regarding its impact. Festel (2013) discusses the
establishment of TTOs, entrepreneurship centers, and incubators to facilitate tech-
nology transfer from academic research to industrial applications (Goldfarb and
Henrekson, 2003; Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006; Rasmussen et al., 2006). Several
studies focus on understanding the relative performance of TTOs (Chapple et al.,
2005), their impact on the creation of spin-off companies (Lockett and Wright,
2005) and their potential role in second-order spin-off activities (Leitch and
Harrison, 2005). The results of these studies indicate that in the UK case, TTOs
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show low levels of efficiency, very heterogeneous performance, and decreasing re-
turns to scale. Siegel et al. (2007a) show that the involvement of a TTO can slow the
commercialization process because of the greater concern with safeguarding re-
searchers’ interests and maximizing university returns. Some perverse effects of the
policies adopted by TTO managers in the United States are highlighted in Litan et al.
(2008), which finds that TTO frequently become bottlenecks to, rather than facili-
tators of, innovation dissemination. Litan et al. stress that implementation of what
they define as the “revenue maximization model of technology transfer,” inhibits the
dissemination of innovation and rewards the university TTO on the basis of the
revenue generated rather than the number of inventions that the university transfers
to industry. In the case of Italy, Muscio (2010) finds that the establishment of a TTO
does not increase the frequency of university–industry interaction; however, he finds
that better managed TTO and greater use of their services by university departments
positively affect the probability of the TTO being involved in university–industry
collaboration. Coupe´ (2003) provides evidence that US universities with a TTO
increased their patenting activity compared to those with no TTO. Chukumba and
Jensen (2005) demonstrate that the older the TTO the higher is its performance.
We have hinted that the scientific literature has paid insufficient attention to
university policies related to the establishment of infrastructures/mechanisms
designed specifically to facilitate academic engagement. The most frequent (often
the only) measures adopted by universities are setting rules and guidelines for re-
search contracts, collaborative research and consultancies, or a framework for con-
tracting. To our knowledge, only Caldera and Debande (2010) investigate the impact
on R&D income (dummy not statistically significant) and number of R&D contracts
(dummy has a negative coefficient) of the existence of R&D contract regulations in
Spanish universities.
2.1.2 Granting rewards to faculty members
In the case of policies related to faculty members’ (rational and monetary) incentives
for engaging in knowledge transfer activities, there is more evidence related to tech-
nology commercialization than for academic engagement.
There is agreement that reward for participation in technology transfer activities is
an important driver of faculty involvement in commercialization (Geuna and
Muscio, 2009). Several mechanisms can be exploited to reward faculty for these
activities including considering patents and licences in promotion and tenure nego-
tiations, and allowing faculty members a larger (relative to that retained by the
department/university) share of licensing or equity revenues. The royalties paid to
faculty may explain some of the variation in technology licensing outcomes (Di
Gregorio and Shane, 2003). There is evidence that universities that allocate higher
percentages of royalty payments to faculty members tend to be associated with more
efficient technology transfer activities (Siegel, et al., 2003; Phan and Siegel, 2006). As
suggested in Friedman and Silberman (2003) and Lach and Schankerman (2004),
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organizational incentives for university technology transfer appear to be an import-
ant determinant of success. However, Friedman and Silberman (2003) note that
greater pecuniary rewards to university inventors (measured by the amount of roy-
alty income they receive) are not significantly associated with the probability of
achieving commercializable outputs. Also, some authors note that, in many coun-
tries, the hoped for basic extrinsic rewards, such as monetary rewards and the
prospect of promotion, by university staff have changed little over the years
(Geoghegan and Pontikakis, 2008). Others, such as Baldini et al. (2007), suggest
that interaction with firms can delay university publication (Rahm, 1994;
Blumenthal et al., 1997; Cohen et al., 2002), which might slow faculty career ad-
vancement. Siegel et al. (2003) highlight the negative effects of patenting activity on
career progression, and Jensen and Thursby (2001) point to the risk, especially in
Europe, that researchers will have less time to devote to research because of the legal
and bureaucratic burden related to collaboration. However, Muscio and Pozzali
(2013) find no evidence of any negative effect of interactions with industry on aca-
demics’ perceptions of the factors hampering technology transfer, while the OECD
(2003) stresses the positive influence of patenting on researchers’ careers and
earnings.
2.1.3 Managing conflict of interests
Several authors point to the potential conflicts of interest (and the need to regulate
them) in academic engagement with industry and research progress or the time
devoted by researchers to traditional academic activities. In marketing technology
to firms and entrepreneurs, academic institutions, and the TTO in particular, must
manage potential conflicts over values and conflicts of interest between academics
and industry (Bradley et al., 2013).
Many licensing agreements include “delay-of-publication” clauses, which explain
why faculty might resist disclosure before their findings are published (Thursby and
Thursby, 2002). For example, Markman et al. (2005b) argue that faculty may disen-
gage from the technology licensing process because it conflicts with tenure and
promotion policies, delays publication, and hinders professional advancement.
According to Debackere and Veugelers (2005), in order to facilitate knowledge
transfer, universities need to establish a clear strategy and a set of guidelines to
manage the transfer process, that do not impinge on their teaching and research
activities. Caldera and Debande (2010) provide evidence of the potential effects of
university regulation on both the frequency and financial value of R&D contracts.
They find that university rules relating to conflicts of interest have a positive effect on
the amount and size of R&D contracts. This would suggest that regulation related to
conflicts of interest between researchers’ teaching commitments and external activ-
ities can improve performance by reducing moral hazard problems and uncertainty
in the appropriation of revenues from external activities. Caldera and Debande find
also that university regulation of researchers’ participation in contract research, and
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rules on the ownership of inventions, have a negative effect on the number of R&D
contracts, but no effect on income. These rules give the university rights to a share of
the researcher’s benefits from the commercialization of the IP generated in an
external research activity. This finding suggests that such rules will deter university
knowledge transfer activity by decreasing researchers’ incentives to engage in external
activities.
2.2 Other determinants of knowledge transfer
The complexity and diversity of university knowledge transfer activities (Muscio,
2010; Perkmann et al., 2011, 2013) have provoked interest in the key drivers of
university performance in knowledge transfer. Empirical work in the economic lit-
erature identifies the organizational context and the individual characteristics of
researchers as two of the most relevant determinants of interaction (Perkmann
et al., 2013).
One of the most salient organizational-level determinants of knowledge transfer is
the quality of the university or academic department. There is evidence that aca-
demic research performance is related to the likelihood of researchers participating in
commercialization activities (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2001; Di Gregorio and Shane,
2003; Sine et al., 2003; O’Shea et al., 2005). There is evidence also that innovative
firms favor research, produced by high-quality research universities, which is pub-
lished in peer-reviewed journals (Hicks et al., 2000; Pavitt, 2001; Bruno and
Orsenigo, 2003). Mansfield (1995) shows that the higher the quality of the university
research and the closer the university is to innovating companies, the greater will be
the academic contribution to industrial innovation. D’Este and Iammarino (2010)
find that the higher the quality of the department, the more likely it will attract
distant business partners. Finally, Chukumba and Jensen (2005) show that univer-
sities producing higher quality research generate more licences and higher income
from licensing. University/department research quality is positively correlated to the
level of commercialization activities, while there seems to be a negative or no cor-
relation between research quality and academic engagement (Perkmann et al., 2013).
The only study that finds at all evidence of a positive relation between research
performance and university knowledge transfer is Muscio et al. (2013), which
finds that departments that achieve higher scores in research evaluation exercises
attract higher levels of external funding in the form of contract research and
consultancies.
Several works analyze the effects of institutional characteristics on university–
industry interaction and knowledge transfer. Recent empirical research shows that
university size is positively related to the level of technology transfer (Belenzon and
Schankerman, 2009). Academic institutions need a critical mass of researchers
to improve their chances of interacting with firms (Bruno and Orsenigo, 2003;
Landry et al., 2007) or to engage in spin-off creation (O’Shea et al., 2005).
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Von Tunzelmann et al. (2003) use group or the subfield-based team as the unit of
analysis and show that the capacity to collect research funding from industry increases
with the share of researchers involved in the research activities, confirming the idea of a
critical mass to attract business finance. Institutions with more research staff are likely
to benefit from greater visibility, greater specialization of departmental research, and
more efficient procedures for the establishment and management of collaborations.
There is a strand in the literature that focuses on the impact of government
funding on knowledge transfer and the strategic importance of creating new channels
of university–industry collaboration and their potential as sources of external fund-
ing for university research (Cohen et al., 1998). This has led to questions about
whether public funds provided to universities and the resources resulting from
knowledge transfer activities are complements or substitutes. A recent review of
university funding (OECD, 2010) shows that European universities are primarily
state-funded. Mechanisms for allocating public funds are an essential element of
the reforms to university systems in several countries, and governments are putting
increasing pressure on universities to raise funding from other sources and to con-
tribute actively to industry innovation (Geuna, 1999; Arnold et al., 2006). The ex-
istence of some form of complementarity between these two types of university
funding would imply that universities need government funding in order to increase
collaboration with industry, and external fundraising opportunities (Mansfield, 1995;
Cohen et al., 1998; Perkmann and Walsh, 2008; Jensen et al., 2010; Dechenaux et al.,
2011). Some show this complementarity empirically (Muscio et al., 2013), based on
the existence of spillovers (Jensen et al., 2010) or signaling and reputational effects
(Connolly, 1997; Blume-Kohout et al., 2009).
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data and research methodology
The empirical analysis is based on three main data sources:
1. The first data source is a publicly available database which provides detailed
department-level information on the volume and sources of academic funding
and the composition of research staff. The data are collected annually by the
Italian Ministry of University and Research (MIUR) and are available in stan-
dardized format for the period 2005–2011. The database includes 1708 academic
departments (which represent the whole population of academic departments in
Italy), in 64 public universities (including 4 polytechnic universities). For the
analysis we select departments with financial data available for at least three
consecutive years. These financial data are matched to an index of research qual-
ity constructed by MIUR based on the evaluation of research output conducted
in 2001–2003. This composite indicator takes account of peer review evaluations
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of research activity carried out at academic institutions (patents, journal impact
factors, etc.).
2. The second data source is a questionnaire survey conducted between September
2012 and February 2013, which was addressed to the central administrations of
the population of Italian public universities. From the 64 questionnaires admin-
istered we received 61 completed questionnaires. This short questionnaire asked
for information on current university knowledge transfer policies as expressed in
the “regolamento conto-terzi,” and the year in which the “regolamenti conto-
terzi” was adopted. These strategic documents describe academic engagement
activities and set specific rules of conduct in several areas such as incentives
for academic staff, conflicts over IPR, withholdings of revenue from the central
administration, etc. The formats used by universities are similar and typically
include a definition of the types of regulated contracts, the amount of money
retained by the university, the remuneration paid to scientists, the distribution of
resources, and exclusion criteria. The survey asked about internal university
regulation of (i) academic engagement activities, IPR, and creation of spin-offs;
(ii) academic scientists’ conflicts of interest related to teaching and external
activities; (iii) the amount of external income withheld to cover internal admin-
istration costs; (iv) the imposition of a limit (ceiling) on extra remuneration to
researchers and administrators involved in external consulting activity;
(v) charges for the transfer of patents; (vi) withholding of royalties from the
sale of IP; and (vii) the share of royalties paid to inventors. The survey showed
that 95% of universities have adopted formal regulation of academic engagement
activity, and most had formal regulation in place before 2007. Therefore, infor-
mation on specific norms and practices regulating private contacts collected in
the period 2012–2013 can be extended to the previous period 2007–2011.3
3. The third data source is a web survey carried out in 2007 on university technol-
ogy transfer activities.4 The 197 academic departments in Italy that responded to
the survey, provided data on the characteristics of university TTOs such as the
year of creation, and type of management (see Muscio et al., 2013). This infor-
mation is available for 45 out of 61 universities. We double-checked the reliability
of this data source using information provided from the yearly NETVAL survey
which collects information on academic technology transfer activity in Italy.
3 The survey provides information on the year the universities adopted a particular knowledge
transfer policy. However, since almost all of them adopted the regulation before 2007 and our study
uses data starting in 2007, we cannot exploit this information to account for “time variant” aca-
demic strategy at the university level.
4 The survey was part of the research project “The Governance of Technology Transfer in Italy,”
funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research (MIUR), and the FIRB project: ‘A
Multidimensional Approach to Technology Transfer’.
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Our final sample, obtained from merging these three sources, covers 1283
academic departments which represent 75% of the whole population of Italian de-
partments belonging to 43 public universities, located in 40 municipalities. In order
to ensure consistency across the three data sources we restricted the period of analysis
to the years 2007–2011.5
Table 1 reports the distribution of departments across the 14 scientific areas (SA)
classified by the Italian University Council (CUN).6 The departments in our sample
engage in research in the nine scientific areas of the Engineering and Physical
Sciences (EPS) represent 63% of the whole sample, with the remainder working in
Social Science fields. Medicine accounts for the largest number of departments
(256—around 20%), and Engineering and Architecture (8 and 9 departments)
account for about 16% of our sample departments.
3.2 Econometric specification
Table 2 presents information on the variables used in the analysis. The dependent
variable is the amount of funding raised by the university department from research
contracts, research-to-order, and consultancies commissioned by public and private
organizations and subject to university regulations (f_acadeng). We use f_acadeng as
a proxy for “academic engagement” activities at department level.7
Our explanatory variables include controls for university knowledge transfer poli-
cies, and the characteristics of intermediaries (age, type of management, etc.) in
order to estimate the effect of university policies on departments’ academic engage-
ment performance. Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for the variables
included in the regressions.
Since a large fraction of departments received no external funding from contract
research and consultancies in the period considered, our dependent variable is partly
continuous, with a positive and large probability mass around zero. We model the
response variables in order to account for the presence of a corner solution outcome.
5 Financial data from MIUR database are available from 2005. However, given that the econometric
model includes among the controls up to two lags of the financial variables (see Section 3.2), the
empirical analysis refers to the period 2007–2011.
6 The National University Council (CUN) classification of scientific areas is similar to that adopted
in the OECD Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002). The scientific areas considered here correspond to the
areas identified in the Frascati Manual as: (i) Natural Sciences, (ii) Engineering and Technology,
(iii) Medical Sciences, (iv) Agricultural Sciences, and (v) Social Sciences.
7 The dependent variable f_acadeng does not include business funding to departments that is not
compensated for by research results (such as in the case of private contributions to conferences and
events, scholarships and prizes for proficient young researchers, etc.). These resources are counted as
separate sources of revenue and generally are relatively small. f_acadeng also does not account for
funding from research programmes/contracts that do not allow income distribution to research
staff.
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We allow also for persistence in the process of collecting these types of external
funding by introducing a 1-year lag in the dependent variable, in order to investigate
the existence of an accumulation advantage along the lines of the Matthew effect
(Merton, 1968).
We use yit to denote department i’s funding from external nonacademic sources
collected at time t; the dynamic panel Tobit model with unobserved department
effects is
yit ¼ x
0
itbþyit1 þ ci þ ct þ uit ; i ¼ 1; :::;N ; t ¼ 1; :::;T
yit ¼ max ð0; yit Þ
ð1Þ
where xit is a set of department-specific characteristics including controls for uni-
versity knowledge transfer policies,8 yit is the 1-year lagged dependent variable, ci is
(random) department-specific effects, ct is year effects, and uit is the error term. Year
Table 1 Sample Composition for scientific area
Code Scientific area Frequency Percent
EPS
MAT-INF Mathematics & Computer Science 61 4.75
FIS Physics 41 3.20
CHIM Chemistry 55 4.29
GEO Geology 27 2.10
BIO Biology 89 6.94
MED Medicine 256 19.95
AGR-VET Agriculture & Veterinary 76 5.92
ICAR Civil Engineering & Architecture 100 7.79
ING IND-INF Industrial Engineering 109 8.50
Social sciences
HUM Humanities 136 10.60
SOC-PSY SA Sociology, philosophy and psychology 94 7.33
LAW SA Law 86 6.70
ECO SA Economics and Statistics 107 8.34
POL SA Political Sciences 46 3.59
Total 1283 100
8 The variables include dummies for the presence of regulations for private contracts in a given
sample year, rules regulating teaching and research activity, the university/department/center with-
holding some of the revenues from academic engagement activities, amount retained, imposition of
limits on individual compensation, amount (%) of charges for patent transfer costs, and share (%)
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Table 2 Data source and definitions
Variable Definition Data source
f_acadeng Volume of funding from research contracts and
consultancies from public and private organisa-
tions raised in the last financial year (2006–2011)
MIUR
University technology transfer policies
reg_acadeng Regulation on academic engagement activities (yes/no) Web survey
conflict Rules regulating teaching and research activity (yes/no) Web survey
amm_withh Total amount of withholdings (%) Web survey
limit_com Limits on individual compensations (yes/no) Web survey
charges_pat Charges for patents transfer costs (yes/no) Web survey
roy_ric Inventor royalty share (%) Web survey
University technology transfer intermediaries
ilo Presence of an Industry Liaison Office MIUR
epo_mngmt Presence at the university of an office managing
European patents. Normally this task is carried out
by offices for valorisation of research results or by
TTOs. These offices have the mission of supporting
research staff in commercialising the results of
scientific research establishing collaborations and
mediating between agents.
MIUR
ilo_age Number of years of ILO activity Web survey
ilo_univ ILO at university level Web survey
ilo_iter ILO at inter-university level (base group) Web survey
ilo_ext Professional non-academic manager Web survey
ilo_prof University professor manager Web survey
ilo_adm University administrative manager Web survey
Departments’ source of revenue
f_ec Research funding from the EC (2005–2011) MIUR
f_miur Research funding from MIUR (2005–2011) MIUR
f_uni Research funding from own university (2005–2011) MIUR
f_pbadmit Research funding from other national and regional
governmental bodies (2006–2011)
MIUR
Departments’ characteristics
p_research Number of research staff (full professors, associate
professors, assistant professors, research officers)
and PhD students (2005–2011)
MIUR
sh_s Share of senior research staff
rating Research rating published by MIUR in 2007, based on
the evaluation of research output carried out over
CIVR VTR (MIUR,
2007)
(continued)
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Table 2 Continued
Variable Definition Data source
the period 2001–2003. This composite indicator
takes into account peer review evaluations of re-
search activity carried out at academic institutions
(patents, impact factor of journal articles, etc.)
Scientific areas Predominant departmental scientific research area MIUR-CINECA
a1 SA Mathematics & Computer Science
a2 SA Physics
a3 SA Chemistry
a4 SA Geology
a5 SA Biology
a6 SA Medicine
a7 SA Agriculture & Veterinary
a8 SA Civil Engineering & Architecture
a9 SA Industrial Engineering
a10 SA Humanities
a11 SA Sociology, philosophy and psychology
a12 SA Law
a13 SA Economics and Statistics
a14 SA Political sciences
University characteristics
d1–d4 Size of the academic institution where the depart-
ment is located. University size is expressed in
terms of number of students: 1 small (510,000); 2
medium (10,000–15,000); 3 large (15,000–
40,000); 4 mega (440,000)
MIUR (2007)
polytech Location of the department in a polytechnic univer-
sity (four in Italy)
University website
med_school Presence of a medical school University website
Indicators of local demand for technology
geo_s, geo_c,
geo_nw geo_ne
Geographical location of the department respectively
in Southern, Central, North-East and North-West
Italy
firmsize Average size of manufacturing companies in the
administrative province where the department is
located
ISTAT 2001 Census
epoprov Number of European patents granted to industrial
researchers resident in the administrative province
where the department is located during the period
2000–2006
PATSTAT database
elaborated by
Centro KITES,
Universita`
Bocconi
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable name Description Observed Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
University technology transfer policies
Regulation private contracts
reg_acadeng Regulation private contracts (yes/
no)
61 0.95 0.22 0 1
conflict Rules regulating teaching and re-
search activity (yes/no)
61 0.44 0.50 0 1
amm_withh Total amount of withholdings (%) 61 0.18 0.17 0 0.86
for the University 60 0.10 0.08 0 0.42
for the Department 51 0.06 0.11 0 0.69
for the Center 50 0.04 0.06 0 0.27
limit_com Limits on individual compensa-
tions (yes/no)
61 0.61 0.49 0 1
on administrative staff 58 0.58 0.50 0 1
on research staff 55 0.50 0.50 0 1
Regulation IP
reg_ip Regulation IP (yes/no) 61 0.36 0.48 0 1
charges_pat Charges for patents sale/transfer (%) 61 0.31 0.29 0 1
roy_ric Researcher royalty share (%) 55 0.49 0.37 0 1
University technology transfer intermediaries
TTOs
ilo Industry Liaison Office (yes/no) 61 0.77 0.43 0 1
epo_mngmt Patent Office (yes/no) 61 0.72 0.45 0 1
ILO characteristics (if ilo¼ Yes)
ilo_age ILO age 47 1.08 2.03 0 8
ilo_univ University ILO (yes/no) 47 0.82 0.39 0 1
ilo_inter Inter-university ILO (yes/no) – Base
group -
47 0.18 0.35 0 1
ILO manager (if ilo¼Yes)
ilo_prof University professor (yes/no) 45 0.52 0.51 0 1
ilo_adm University administrative (yes/no) 45 0.32 0.47 0 1
ilo_ext Professional non-academic (yes/
no) – Base group -
45 0.16 0.37 0 1
Other University characteristics
University structure
med_school Medical school 64 0.56 0.50 0 1
polytech Polytechnic university 64 0.06 0.24 0 1
d1 Small university (510,000 students) 60 0.20 0.40 0 1
d2 Medium university (10,000–
14.999)
60 0.17 0.38 0 1
d3 Large university (15,000–39,999) 60 0.47 0.50 0 1
d4 Mega university (439,999) 60 0.17 0.38 0 1
(continued)
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Table 3 Continued
Variable name Description Observed Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
Geographical characteristics
geo_c Center 64 0.23 0.43 0 1
geo_s South 64 0.34 0.48 0 1
geo_ne North-east 64 0.20 0.41 0 1
geo_nw North-west –Base group - 64 0.22 0.42 0 1
epoprov Number of European patents
granted in the local area
64 9.93 17.13 0 58.70
firmsize Average size of manufacturing
firms in the local area
64 7.72 2.36 3.11 11.78
Department characteristics
Financial revenues per researcher (in thousands of Euros)
f_acadeng Research contracts and
consultancies
5636 5.82 11.53 0 162.29
f_miur MIUR 5636 2.22 5.12 0 152.40
f_ec European Commission 5636 2.50 10.65 0 426.50
f_uni Internal transfers 5636 3.35 3.75 0 47.40
f_pbadmit Other public bodies 5636 3.43 9.79 0 243.42
Researchers characteristics
p_research Research staff 5636 32.32 19.95 2 201
sh_s Share of senior research staff 5636 0.30 0.10 0 0.93
rating Research rating published by MIUR 5636 0.78 0.10 0.37 1
Scientific areas dummies
a1 SA Mathematics & Computer
Science –Base group-
5636 0.05 0.22 0 1
a2 SA Physics 5636 0.03 0.18 0 1
a3 SA Chemistry 5636 0.04 0.20 0 1
a4 SA Geology 5636 0.02 0.14 0 1
a5 SA Biology 5636 0.07 0.25 0 1
a6 SA Medicine 5636 0.20 0.40 0 1
a7 SA Agriculture & Veterinary 5636 0.06 0.24 0 1
a8 SA Civil Engineering & Architecture 5636 0.08 0.26 0 1
a9 SA Industrial Engineering 5636 0.08 0.28 0 1
a10 SA Humanities 5636 0.10 0.31 0 1
a11 SA Sociology, philosophy and
psychology
5636 0.07 0.26 0 1
a12 SA Law 5636 0.07 0.26 0 1
a13 SA Economics and Statistics 5636 0.08 0.27 0 1
a14 SA Political Sciences 5636 0.04 0.18 0 1
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effects are included to account for cyclical variations in external funding.9 In order to
handle the initial condition problem in a dynamic nonlinear unobserved effects
model, we follow the methodology suggested by Wooldridge (2005).10
The vector xit also contains a set of covariates that might be correlated with
department capability to engage in knowledge transfer activity, such as (twice
lagged) public funding from MIUR and the European Commission,11 department
size (administrative and research staff), quality/reputation, management, location,
research area, university structural characteristics, and external spillovers.
3.3 Results
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the Tobit model. Columns (1) and (2)
report the results (respectively the coefficients and marginal effects) for the pooled
Tobit model which ignores the presence of unobserved random effects; Columns (3)
to (6) focus on the unobserved effects dynamic Tobit model, which is our preferred
specification.
Regarding the effect of university academic engagement policies on departments’
research-to-order, contract research, and consulting activities, we find first that the
presence of formal university-level rules for academic engagement has a positive
effect on the average amount of external funding received by researchers. The esti-
mated coefficient is highly significant in both models (M1 and M2), implying, ceteris
paribus, a difference in the amount of funding from research contracts, research-to-
order, and consultancies, of E1500 per researcher [see Columns (4) and (6)]. The
estimated effects account for more than 50% of the observed difference in amount of
funding from academic engagement activities, between departments with and with-
out formal regulation. This result clearly indicates that regulation that provides a set
of guidelines for the management and transfer process and precisely specifies the role
of researchers and institutions is positively correlated with the likelihood of academic
engagement. Second, the imposition of a limit on the economic benefit that the
researcher might obtain from these external research activities has a negative
impact on likelihood that the department will collaborate nonacademic entities.
of royalties retained by the inventor. See Tables 2 and 3 for details of data source, definitions, and
descriptive statistics.
9 See Tables 2 and 3 for more detail on the controls used in the model and some summary statistics.
10 The approach suggested in Wooldridge (2005) can be easily implemented for the Tobit and probit
regressions through straightforward estimation using standard econometric software. This method-
ology implies longitudinally averaged explanatory variables for each department, with the initial
outcome values used as additional regressors. The coefficients of the longitudinally averaged ex-
planatory variables are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.
11 Both MIUR and EC funding are lagged twice, in order to avoid potential endogeneity or collin-
earity with the lagged dependent variable.
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Table 4 Dynamic Panel data tobit regressions
Dependent variable:
f_acadeng
Pooled Tobit Random effects
tobit (M1)
Random effects
tobit (M2)
Coefficient Marginal
effects
Coefficient Marginal
effects
Coefficient Marginal
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
University technology transfer policies
reg_acadeng 2.908*** 1.230*** 3.562*** 1.451*** 3.778*** 1.536***
(0.791) (0.304) (1.012) (0.367) (1.312) (0.471)
conflict 0.613* 0.285* 0.619 0.282 0.403 0.184
(0.324) (0.151) (0.416) (0.190) (0.582) (0.266)
amm_withh 0.564 0.262 0.623 0.284 0.0367 0.0167
(0.387) (0.181) (0.496) (0.227) (0.601) (0.274)
limit_com 0.794** 0.372** 0.867* 0.398* 1.077* 0.498*
(0.394) (0.186) (0.502) (0.233) (0.601) (0.282)
charges_pat 2.119*** 0.983*** 3.038*** 1.381*** 3.265*** 1.491***
(0.756) (0.350) (0.976) (0.443) (1.142) (0.521)
roy_ric 1.632*** 0.757*** 2.170*** 0.986*** 2.445*** 1.117***
(0.516) (0.239) (0.665) (0.302) (0.749) (0.342)
Technology transfer intermediaries
Ilo 0.806 0.367 1.029* 0.457* 0.400 0.131
(0.513) (0.229) (0.621) (0.277) (1.418) (0.663)
epo_mngmt 0.218 0.101 0.364 0.166 1.062 0.496
(0.427) (0.200) (0.543) (0.250) (0.723) (0.397)
ilo_age 0.100* 0.0457*
(0.061) (0.024)
ilo_univ 1.766 0.792
(1.248) (0.549)
ilo_prof 0.254 0.116
(1.035) (0.471)
ilo_adm 0.620 0.285
(0.982) (0.455)
University characteristics
med_school 2.035*** 0.985*** 2.384*** 1.139*** 3.104*** 1.521***
(0.431) (0.218) (0.552) (0.276) (0.634) (0.331)
polytech 0.782 0.372 0.829 0.387 1.314 0.625
(0.753) (0.366) (0.968) (0.462) (1.095) (0.541)
d2 1.751*** 0.777*** 1.841** 0.799** 0.708 0.317
(0.672) (0.285) (0.864) (0.358) (1.132) (0.497)
d3 1.566*** 0.733*** 1.811** 0.833** 2.965*** 1.376***
(0.601) (0.284) (0.772) (0.359) (0.838) (0.395)
d4 1.890*** 0.892** 2.276** 1.056** 4.227*** 2.000***
(0.730) (0.350) (0.939) (0.444) (1.108) (0.542)
(continued)
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Table 4 Continued
Dependent variable:
f_acadeng
Pooled Tobit Random effects
tobit (M1)
Random effects
tobit (M2)
Coefficient Marginal
effects
Coefficient Marginal
effects
Coefficient Marginal
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Other financial revenues (departments)
f_acadeng(1) 0.725*** 0.336*** 0.611*** 0.278*** 0.650*** 0.297***
(0.0107) (0.0058) (0.0188) (0.010) (0.0245) (0.0125)
f_miur(2) 0.079*** 0.037*** 0.092*** 0.042*** 0.088*** 0.040***
(0.019) (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.0205) (0.0094)
f_ec(-2) 0.0254* 0.0118* 0.0262* 0.0119* 0.0163* 0.00745*
(0.0141) (0.0065) (0.0148) (0.0067) (0.0098) (0.0045)
f_uni(2) 0.0259 0.0120 0.0193 0.00876 0.0447 0.0204
(0.0347) (0.0161) (0.0369) (0.0168) (0.0373) (0.0170)
f_pbadmit(-2) 0.0031 0.0014 0.0054 0.0025 0.0057 0.0026
(0.0132) (0.00612) (0.0140) (0.00638) (0.0150) (0.0068)
Other department characteristics
a2 0.267 0.123 0.267 0.120 0.419 0.189
(0.843) (0.384) (1.103) (0.493) (1.053) (0.469)
a3 2.237*** 1.112*** 2.508** 1.231** 2.451*** 1.207**
(0.757) (0.403) (0.994) (0.525) (0.950) (0.503)
a4 3.775*** 1.979*** 4.336*** 2.262*** 4.154*** 2.166***
(0.936) (0.549) (1.232) (0.728) (1.176) (0.692)
a5 1.327* 0.640* 1.789* 0.857* 1.641* 0.787*
(0.707) (0.355) (0.921) (0.464) (0.886) (0.445)
a6 2.488** 1.215** 2.761*** 1.328*** 2.703** 1.304***
(0.614) (0.315) 0.801) (0.407) (0.774) (0.393)
a7 3.256*** 1.665*** 3.738*** 1.896*** 3.748*** 1.915***
(0.752) (0.421) (0.980) (0.550) (0.976) (0.553)
a8 4.285*** 2.249*** 5.185*** 2.728*** 5.141*** 2.715***
(0.695) (0.409) (0.909) (0.545) (0.893) (0.536)
a9 6.022*** 3.305*** 7.606*** 4.251*** 7.090*** 3.933***
(0.675) (0.431) (0.903) (0.600) (0.908) (0.591)
a10 5.488*** 2.195*** 6.175*** 2.388*** 6.089*** 2.367***
(0.715) (0.243) (0.919) (0.298) (0.891) (0.290)
a11 2.462*** 1.062*** 2.926*** 1.224*** 2.855*** 1.201***
(0.716) (0.287) (0.926) (0.355) (0.901) (0.348)
a12 3.545*** 1.481*** 4.186*** 1.687*** 3.993*** 1.624***
(0.757) (0.283) (0.975) (0.346) (0.959) (0.344)
a13 0.397 0.186 0.0885 0.0403 0.14 0.0671
(0.745) (0.354) (0.969) (0.443) (0.949) (0.437)
a14 0.138 0.064 0.486 0.218 0.267 0.121
(0.866) (0.398) (1.125) (0.496) (1.094) (0.491)
(continued)
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This disincentive effect applies also to the amount of income withheld to cover the
costs related to patent transfers. Third, royalty sharing arrangements are key deter-
minants of performance. The estimated coefficient of inventor’s royalty share is
positive and significant, and a 10 percentage point increase in the inventor’s royalty
Table 4 Continued
Dependent variable:
f_acadeng
Pooled Tobit Random effects
tobit (M1)
Random effects
tobit (M2)
Coefficient Marginal
effects
Coefficient Marginal
effects
Coefficient Marginal
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rating 3.139* 1.456* 2.706 1.230 4.361* 1.992*
(1.879) (0.871) (2.411) (1.096) (2.449) (1.118)
p_research 0.0148** 0.007** 0.013* 0.006* 0.015* 0.007*
(0.0064) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
sh_s 0.269 0.125 0.584 0.266 0.451 0.206
(1.300) (0.603) (1.593) (0.724) (1.568) (0.716)
Geographical characteristics
geo_s 2.755*** 1.253*** 3.495*** 1.551*** 3.971*** 1.768***
(0.680) (0.303) (0.879) (0.381) (1.196) (0.519)
geo_c 1.757*** 0.787*** 2.401*** 1.042*** 3.165*** 1.357***
(0.650) (0.281) (0.844) (0.349) (0.980) (0.393)
geo_ne 1.523*** 0.682*** 1.960*** 0.851*** 3.363*** 1.423***
(0.539) (0.232) (0.699) (0.290) (0.975) (0.381)
epoprov 0.0226 0.0105 0.0296 0.0134 0.0685** 0.0313**
(0.0173) (0.00801) (0.0223) (0.0101) (0.0300) (0.0137)
firmsize 0.106 0.0490 0.0952 0.0433 0.299* 0.137*
(0.106) (0.0492) (0.135) (0.0614) (0.160) (0.0730)
Constant 7.018*** 6.557** 8.898***
(2.209) (2.824) (2.984)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R^2 0.423 0.421 0.441
Random effects vs. pooled
Tobi
(H0: rho¼0)
2¼78.99
(P¼0.000)
2¼ 32.22
(P¼0.000)
Observations 5636 5636 5467
Number of groups 1283 1244
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Longitudinally
averaged explanatory variables for each department and the initial outcome values are also
included in the regressions Wooldridge (2005).
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share results in an average increase in amount of external research funding of about
E100 per researcher with an implied elasticity of around 23%.
The next ranked determinant is knowledge transfer intermediaries. We include
dummies for the presence of an industry liaison office (ilo) and/or an office to
manage European patents (epo_mngmt). We control for the characteristics (age,
type, and management) of the industry liaison office. The existence of an industry
liaison office seems to have a positive effect (Table 4, Columns 3 and 4), although
this effect disappears when we control its characteristics (Table 4, Columns 5 and 6).
The other characteristics we control for do not impact significantly on departmental
external research activity. Among the variables used to control for differences in
university and department characteristics (Table 4), we find that the presence of a
medical school has a negative effect on department funding from academic engage-
ment activities. This is explained mainly by the fact that medical schools are treated
as autonomous cost centers, which means that typically research contracts, research-
to-order, and consulting activities are managed without departmental involvement.
The dummy for polytechnic university has a positive (but only marginally signifi-
cant) effect on revenues from consulting-contract research. Departments in large
universities are more likely to engage in collaborations. There are positive effects
from critical mass in large academic institutions on external funding, expressed in
terms of university reputation, visibility and research team size. Among department
characteristics, our regressions show that structural characteristics have an impact on
department funding from academic engagement activities. The capacity to obtain
funding from external sources depends largely on the type of research carried out by
the department. Departments in research areas a9 (Industrial Engineering) and
a8 (Civil Engineering and Architecture) and to a lesser extent a7 (Agriculture and
Veterinary) are more involved in external research activity. We find also that research
performance (rating) has a large and significant impact on external research funding to
universities, which means that high-quality research generates valuable knowledge that
can be passed to industry, and that research performance provides a signal to industry
of the best university departments. Finally, in line with Muscio et al. (2013), the results
confirm that public funding (from national and European Commission sources) plays
an important role in stimulating academic engagement activities.
Since university-level incentive systems for knowledge transfer may have different
impacts based on the department’s intrinsic attitude to cooperation with nonaca-
demic institutions, in the next step of the analysis we investigate whether the effects
of policies and strategies aimed at enhancing departments’ and nonacademic
institutions’ interactions are homogeneous across different research areas.
Following Coccia and Rolfo (2008), we classify research departments into four
homogeneous scientific research areas: (i) basic sciences (B) which includes math-
ematics, physics, and chemistry; (ii) life sciences (LF) which includes the fields of
geology, medicine, biology, and molecular biology; (iii) engineering and technology
(ING) which includes engineering, architecture, and technology; and (iv) humanities
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and social and economic sciences (HSE) which includes departments in the fields of
sociology, psychology, law, economics, and political science. We apply the econometric
specification in (i) on the four groups separately. The results are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that university-level academic engagement policies have a signifi-
cant and strong impact on the ability to obtain funding from contract research,
research-to-order, and consultancies, in departments operating in applied research
fields such as engineering and life sciences (Columns 2 and 3). For these depart-
ments, the presence of a well-defined university strategy to regulate academic en-
gagement activities acts as an incentive for academic researchers to engage in external
collaborations. The effects are similar, although the coefficients are smaller and/or
less precisely estimated, for departments in human and social sciences (Column 4).
Departments that are more basic research-oriented and less involved in external
collaborations (Column 1) do not respond to incentives provided by regulation of
knowledge transfer features. This difference may be related to the fact that basic
research-oriented departments face obstacles to industry collaboration linked to
the nature of their research activity which are more difficult to mitigate.
For engineering and life sciences departments, monetary incentives play a major
role in the capability to attract external funding. In these cases, a limit on individual
compensation and retention of income to cover patents/IPR sale/transfer affect the
involvement of departments in knowledge transfer activities. In the case of basic
sciences and social sciences departments we found very weak or no evidence of
this effect.
4. Policy recommendations
4.1 Policy implications for national and supranational policymakers
There is a consensus that universities are important for fostering innovation and
economic growth through knowledge transfer to nonacademic public and private
institutions. However, policymakers in Europe often promote university knowledge
transfer as the means of obtaining additional sources of funding for university re-
search and ensuring the financial sustainability of universities in a context of gov-
ernment spending reviews. Concern over the financial sustainability of universities is
well founded. Estermann and Claeys-Kulik (2013) stress that the high levels of public
funding in the budgets of most European universities mean that any reduction will
have a major impact. However, our empirical results show that the various origins
(national or European Commission) and forms of public funding complement ex-
ternal funding from academic engagement activities. This suggests that a shift from
public to external funding will negatively affect the capabilities of universities to
transfer knowledge through these less formal channels, and that cuts to public fund-
ing of universities should be selective.
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Table 5 Dynamic panel data Tobit regressions by main scientific research areas
Dependent variable:
¼ f_acadeng
Basic sciences Life sciences Engineering and
technology
Social sciences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
University technology transfer policies
reg_acadeng 0.809 2.647*** 1.802* 0.997***
(1.753) (0.818) (1.011) (0.330)
conflict 0.298 0.129 0.321 0.415*
(0.918) (0.564) (2.121) (0.220)
amm_withh 1.220 1.471** 1.372** 0.270
(0.931) (0.692) (0.664) (0.245)
limit_com 1.452 1.628** 0.526 0.173
(0.976) (0.661) (1.704) (0.250)
charges_pat 2.190 1.028* 6.623** 0.354
(1.491) (0.539) (2.686) (0.464)
roy_ric 0.0841 1.266** 3.153* 0.639**
(1.077) (0.653) (1.783) (0.310)
Technology transfer intermediaries
epo_mngmt 2.038 0.246 2.898 0.0100
(2.166) (0.590) (1.830) (0.239)
ilo_age 0.113 0.221 0.924* 0.0698*
(0.128) (0.135) (0.515) (0.0412)
ilo_univ 0.314 3.122** 0.0191 0.206
(1.561) (1.290) (3.603) (0.495)
ilo_prof 1.674 0.672 1.450 0.773*
(1.637) (1.103) (2.355) (0.439)
ilo_adm 0.498 1.020 0.464 0.0480
(1.549) (1.190) (2.806) (0.425)
University characteristics
med_school 1.893 2.632** 1.186 1.457***
(1.241) (1.100) (1.593) (0.327)
polytech 1.297 0.0211 0.272 2.109*
(1.173) (1.223) (2.956) (1.246)
d2 0.277 0.691 0.311 0.376
(2.047) (1.256) (2.504) (0.392)
d3 1.527 3.035** 1.347 0.639
(1.213) (1.220) (2.013) (0.421)
d4 2.436 4.267*** 1.732 1.024*
(1.886) (1.126) (2.727) (0.595)
Other financial revenues (departments)
f_acadeng(-1) 0.196*** 0.431*** 0.486*** 0.0625***
(0.0338) (0.0113) (0.0217) (0.0165)
f_miur(-2) 0.0381** 0.0231* 0.0856** 0.0371*
(0.0170) (0.0137) (0.0363) (0.0198)
f_ec(-2) 0.000948 0.0291** 0.00410** 0.0132
(0.0144) (0.0135) (0.00212) (0.0146)
(continued)
University regulation and university–industry interaction 23 of 33
 at LU
ISS G
uido Carli on O
ctober 21, 2014
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Table 5 Continued
Dependent variable:
¼ f_acadeng
Basic sciences Life sciences Engineering and
technology
Social sciences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
f_uni(-2) 0.0232 0.0242 0.0125 0.00404
(0.0354) (0.0303) (0.0717) (0.0192)
f_pbadmit(-2) 0.0262* 0.0238*** 0.0141 0.0139
(0.0149) (0.00907) (0.0421) (0.00919)
Other department characteristics
a1 ref.
-
a2 0.36
(0.596)
a3 1.010**
(0.504)
a4 0.326
(0.563)
a5 1.201***
(0.433)
a6 0.641*
(0.351)
a7 ref.
-
a8 1.520**
(0.687)
a9 ref
a10 1.137***
(0.225)
a11 0.545***
(0.205)
a12 0.671***
(0.206)
a13 0.268
(0.232)
a14 ref
Rating 3.104 4.796** 5.622 0.587
(4.266) (2.305) (7.458) (0.831)
P_research 0.00352 0.00590 0.00104 0.00147
(0.00752) (0.00668) (0.0163) (0.00360)
sh_s 0.345 1.627 1.083 1.393**
(2.170) (1.284) (3.258) (0.547)
Geographical characteristics
geo_s 1.093 2.588*** 0.917 1.611***
(1.647) (0.892) (2.820) (0.468)
geo_c 0.779 1.761*** 1.401 0.965***
(1.354) (0.650) (2.410) (0.325)
(continued)
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Furthermore, recent policy effort has been directed to inducing universities to
become financially sustainable through the use of strategic management tools.
Political pressure is increasing on universities to adopt “full cost methods.” This
would involve universities identifying and calculating all the direct and indirect costs
of their activities, including projects, in order to ascertain their financial sustainability
(European University Association, 2008; Estermann and Claeys-Kulik, 2013) and to
provide the information necessary to price external project-based academic research
such that it does not distort the competition with nonacademic research institutions
operating in the market (European Commission, 2008). The discussion of pros and
cons of full costing as a methodology, and its antitrust implications, is beyond the scope
of this study. However, the emphasis on the need for universities to adopt full cost
methods should not be ignored; it could have major implications for universities’
research performance and knowledge transfer capabilities. The most immediate and
obvious consequence of adopting full cost methods would be increased prices,12 which
Table 5 Continued
Dependent variable:
¼ f_acadeng
Basic sciences Life sciences Engineering and
technology
Social sciences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
geo_ne 0.350 2.662*** 0.0593 0.746**
(1.340) (0.608) (2.324) (0.301)
epoprov 0.00906 0.0110 0.0230 0.0153
(0.0455) (0.0313) (0.0912) (0.0136)
firmsize 0.137 0.342** 0.234** 0.0400
(0.274) (0.145) (0.102) (0.0725)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R^2 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.32
Random effects vs. pooled
Tobit
(H0: rho¼ 0)
2¼25.55
(P¼0.000)
2¼15.72
(P¼0.000)
2¼ 22.30
(P¼0.000)
2¼ 15.98
(P¼0.000)
Observations 702 1912 891 1962
Number of groups 150 445 206 443
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%. Marginal effects. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Longitudinally averaged explanatory variables for each department and the initial outcome
values are also included in the regressions Wooldridge (2005).
12 For consulting and the contract research activities supplied to nonacademic institutions univer-
sities set higher prices to include indirect costings in the calculation base. There are objective
difficulties related to calculating indirect costs at project level due to the difficulties to identify
reasonable drivers in complex organizations, and calculating the expected number of projects to be
covered by these overheads.
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inevitably would reduce demand from nonacademic institutions for contract research
and consultancies if the full cost-based price exceeded their willingness to pay. Since
research activities are often characterized by high and indivisible fixed costs (Arrow,
1962) and relatively low marginal costs, there is a possibility that the socially desirable
volume of research activity will not be achieved, to the detriment of knowledge transfer.
Another, more subtle concern related to the adoption of a full cost methodology is
the risk of “academic drift” based on funding, that is, universities could choose
external research activities/projects based on their being fully funded rather than
on the basis of their scientific appeal.
More generally, if, as expected, universities are asked to contribute to innovation
and economic growth, then policies should be aimed at maximizing the amount and
speed of knowledge transfer, rather than the income deriving from these activities.
Although the financial sustainability of universities is an important issue that must
be taken into account when designing policy measures, it should not become the
main policy priority because this would de facto neglect the crucial role of publicly
funded universities in remedying to innovation market failures.
4.2 Policy implications at university level
Our empirical results emphasize that formal university regulation of academic en-
gagement has a positive effect on departments’ capabilities to undertake these activ-
ities, which signals also that nonacademic institutions prefer buying contract research
and consultancy services from universities with clear and transparent economic and
legal rules.
The most relevant issue in academic engagement regulation seems to be design of
an appropriate monetary incentive scheme for faculty members’ involvement in
external activities. We found that low levels of individual compensation to the aca-
demics involved in these activities have a severe negative impact on the overall
engagement of the department in knowledge transfer. We found also that the
amount retained by the university/department/center is not statistically significant
in the aggregate regression, but is relevant and significant for life sciences and en-
gineering and technology departments. Research in these areas generally relies heavily
on the university’s technical facilities and laboratories, which implies that academic
engagement activities in these areas must be disclosed to university administrators
and carried out officially. However, it is likely that our data do not capture the real
amount of academic engagement in the social sciences and even basic sciences, since
many collaborative research activities are based on individual contracts between the
academic researcher and the external institution. These differences among research
areas suggest that departments in the same university, rather than being constrained
by university-level knowledge transfer policy and regulation, should be better
enabled to define their own knowledge transfer strategy and regulation according
to their particular research specialization.
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Finally, department performance is positively influenced by the share of royalties
received by participating academics, but negatively associated with the amounts re-
tained by the university administration for sale/transfer of patents. Thus, monetary
incentives play a fundamental role also in explaining departments’ knowledge trans-
fer performance.
Overall, our empirical evidence has some important implications for university
administrations. The norms regulating university knowledge transfer activities
should embody effective monetary incentives schemes that reward academics’ par-
ticipation in these activities. Retention of fund by the university/department/center
should be limited to activities that involve specific university facilities, laboratories,
or equipment, and calculated to cover the incremental costs. If knowledge transfer is
a priority for the university, then the traditional academic reward system (focused on
peer-reviewed publications) needs to be adapted to take account also of knowledge
transfer (focused on revenue generated by commercialization and academic engage-
ment activities) (Siegel et al., 2007b), at both the national and local levels. For in-
stance, involvement in knowledge transfer activities in their various forms should
count toward academic career advancement.
5. Concluding remarks
The recent scientific literature emphasizes that, in addition to activities related to the
commercialization of academic research (e.g. creation of IP and academic entrepre-
neurship), there are other, less formal, channels of knowledge transfer that many
companies regard as more valuable than commercialization (Cohen et al., 2002) and
that can contribute significantly to innovation and economic growth. Contract re-
search, research-to-order, and consulting services, activities that Perkmann et al.
(2013) term as academic engagement, represent powerful and effective ways of
transferring academic knowledge to the nonacademic domain. Academic engage-
ment includes informal collaborations which are highly relational and produce im-
portant learning-by-interacting effects (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008).
This article contributes to our understanding of the role of university policies and
governance systems on departments’ abilities to obtain external funding through
academic engagement activities. We provide empirical evidence that the presence
of rules regulating research contracts and consultancy activity is beneficial for de-
partments, and that monetary incentives and research income for researchers are
crucial for explaining the different performance of departments in terms of their
ability to collect external funding through external collaboration.
We found also that academic research performance (which seems to act as a signal
of quality to nonacademic institutions) has a more positive effect on this type of
external funding than the presence of an industry liaison or patent office. This sug-
gests that university policies should focus more on increasing the quality of research
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than investing in organizations to facilitate the process of knowledge transfer to
industry, especially if these facilities are aimed at maximizing revenues rather than
maximizing the number and frequency of knowledge transfer opportunities.
Our findings confirm the existence of complementarities between the various forms
of public research funding and funding from consulting and contract research activ-
ities, which is in line with other recent scientific contributions. From a theoretical
perspective, there is a positive relationship between public funding and finance ob-
tained from contract research and consultancies insofar as expanding the knowledge
base and accumulating technical and human capital enabled by public research fund-
ing, increase the marginal rate of return (or reduce the incremental cost) of external
demand for research. This implies that the regulation of academic consultancy and
research-to-order activities should be inscribed within a systemic framework to avoid
possible conflicting effects: it could be that the possible positive impact on knowledge
transfer to industry associated with government efforts to increase public research
funding to universities would be nullified by poorly designed university consultancy
regulation, that is a regulation that weakens researchers’ (monetary and rational)
incentives to engage in research activities with nonacademic institutions. This study
emphasizes also that national and supranational university policies designed without a
comprehensive vision, could have perverse effects on universities’ capabilities to trans-
fer knowledge, as in the case of the adoption of full cost methodology.
It is well known that Italian universities are facing a decline in public funding
which is forcing them to consider external funding options as a way to ensure in-
crease in their financial sustainability. This has led universities to withhold a share of
the revenues derived from consulting and research-to-order activities that rely on
university facilities (i.e. laboratories and technical and administrative personnel) in
order to cover part of the related costs and/or overheads. However, the amounts
withheld are often arbitrary and not directly related to the scientific area or university
facilities involved, and do not necessarily benefit the departments concerned. This
revenue sometimes is used to finance initiatives totally unrelated to the research that
generated it, or as arbitrary payments to administrative personnel under the heading
of “incentive projects.” This reduces researchers’ incentives to engage in consultancy
activities, and may encourage informal collaboration with industry (especially by
departments such as humanities whose work does not involve use of the university’s
technical facilities).
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